This article is an analysis of the main patterns of institutional continuity and change that characterize the German federal political system under the influence of 'Europeani zation'. It shows the different degrees of Europeanization to which the German political institutions and public policies have already adapted. Introducing some guiding theoretical approaches that have been applied to raise the analytical validity of Europeanization, it attempts to explain the range and the degree to which the German state and its domestic polities, politics and public policies have been integrated into the EU governance system. After analysing the core institutional features of the German federal system which gene rally resist European integration, it presents some evidence on the adjustments made to the (reunified) German intergovernmental system, designed to further stimulate European integration. Finally, it presents a brief summary of the lessons learnt from 'Europeanizing German federalism', in order to examine whether typical patterns explaining the Europea nization of the EU member states can be identified.
Introduction
In 1943, from his exile in the US, the renowned German novelist, Thomas Mann, broadcast a warning to the listeners of Radio New York. He claimed cesses of national institutions and their public policies to a changing external environment:
Europeanization is an incremental process re-orienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making (Ladrech 1994, 69).
However, Wessels (1997, 36 ) is more precise, when he defines the term 'Europeanization' as an ongoing and time-consuming process, whereby va rious economic, administrative, social and political actors shift the center of gravity of decision-making from a traditional, strictly national level to a mul ti-level focus that considers the EU as part of the domestic structure. In this perspective, the EU acts as 'a co-formulator for national political choices' ( . This is mainly due to the fact that, in public opinion, the nation state organized as a parliamentary democracy has for long been identified as the only democratically legitimate form of governance (Zervakis 2003: 283) . Meanwhile it belongs to conventional wisdom in integration studies that Europeanization has influenced virtually all sectors of the political system of Germany: from polity (institutions) and politics (formulation of political objectives) to various public policies -but its effects on each of these areas differ in size and scope. Furthermore, a set of theoretical proposals has been developed to explain convincingly the ambivalent effects that the difficult process of Europeanization causes in its confrontation with the different horizontal and vertical layers of the German federal govern mental system. In the following, the theories will be applied only generally to the basic institutions and policy sectors of the German political system to give an idea of the varying degree of the broader adaptive process that Germany, as a member state, has experienced through European integration. In this way the explanatory strength of those theories will become clear in a middle range perspective (see Table 1 The modest Europeanization gains of federal government can best be explained by applying the formally dominant multi-level 'win-set' theory (Bulmer / Bulmer 2000: 280). Is the nation-state revitalized by its symbiosis with the EU, as the inter-governmental approach (Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1999) suggests, or does it, conversely, lose its significance, as the federalists assume? This theory suggests that the federal government has been able to optimize its national resources and copes more or less efficiently at the European level.
The pragmatic 'joint decision' thesis, on the other hand, explains how and why the compatible executive co-operative federal structures in Germany and the EU may lead to a stalemate -a 'joint decision gap' (Scharpf / Reissert / Schnabel 1976; Scharpf 1994)-, if institutional involvement in decision-ma king by permanent negotiations is too rigidly fixed by 'political interconnec tedness' (Politikverflechtung) (Luthardt 1996) . Any decision on EU-legislation demanding a unified German vote is usually undermined by the absence of a powerful German decision center because of the antagonistic relations bet ween Bund and Länder. Länder governments, which dominate the less Europliile Bundesrat, are typical role models for the intensive Europeanization of German executive federalism at the expense of the national (Bundestag) and the sub-national parliaments (Landtage) which lose further legislative compe tences to Europe and thus transparency and legitimacy. The Länder adminis trations are forced to collaborate not only with the Bund in Berlin but also directly with the core EU-institutions in Brussels to secure their economic and political survival. But the predicted 'joint decision trap' has not worked out when the German government, with its prime objective of safeguarding the introduction of the Euro (and EMU), actively supported further sacrifices of national sovereignty in the negotiations leading to the Maastricht (but less so in the Amsterdam and Nice) Treaties (Beuter 2002: 93 Today's hard empirical evidence shows that the core democratic institu tions in Germany (including the directly or indirectly elected federal govern ment, parliament and Federal Council, as well as the strong political parties acting as institutionalized intermediaries between the polity and the politics dimensions which compete for political power gained by national elections) have successfully resisted Europeanization, as far as their convergence to a European state model is concerned (see Table 1 and Jachtenfuchs / KohlerKoch 2003: 37). Though their policy decisions are not any longer shaped independently from Europe (degree 1), they are a long way from a fused system of European Governance (at the average degree only 3-4 in a scale up to 10). Conversely, the more economically oriented public policies have been Europeanized more eagerly and easily (at the average degree 9-7): agriculture (degree 9), currency union (degree 9), environment (degree 8), regional policies (degree 8), justice and home affairs (degree 7), and the majority of Table 1 ) and the general access to the EC/EU-Judiciary (4 in 1992/2000, see Table 2 ). However, the overall German legal system is merely on the verge of becoming integrated (1.8 in 2000, see Table 2 and Hess 2003). 
b) Representing the Länder in Brussels
Prior to Maastricht the German Länder had already gained some institu tional standing at the EU level to somewhat counterbalance their information deficits as regards the federal government. Since the late 1950s, and until the end of the 80s, a 'Länder Observer with the European Communities', which could act only unofficially, was installed in the Bundesrat with offices in Bonn and Brussels. As a kind of passive member of the German delegation to the Council of Ministers, he was to participate at negotiations, but merely to improve the Bundesrat's access to information on Community developments. Though, in 1979, the Länder started to nominate their own representatives in the German delegation to the Council, the information on EU decisions provided by the Observer's office was not regarded any longer as specific enough to satisfy individual Länder interests. Because his function as a direct source of information is limited to the traditional domestic Länder participa tion in federal legislation, the Observer's office is not meant to be engaged in individual lobbying activities of the Länder influencing EU legislation (Goetz 1995 In relation to the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the German Basic Law had to be amended in two places to comply with the Treaty's provisions:
• Amendment to article 28 grants Union citizens the right to stand and vote in local government elections.
• Amendment of article 88 transfers powers of the Bundesbank to the Eu ropean Central Bank.
As a kind of compensation for the Länder's consent to revise the German constitution, the domestically regulated Bund-Länder relations were integra ted into the framework of European integration. The constitutional changes, adopted in 1992, include:
• The amendment to article 50 Basic German Law. The Länder received additional participation rights in all 'matters concerning the European Union' through the Bundesrat.
• An addition to article 52 (3) Basic German Law. It provides for the Bundesrat to form a separate European Chamber (Europakammer) to take all decisions concerning EU matters.
• The insertion of a new article 23 Basic German Law on European Union.
It upgrades Bund-Länder co-operation on EU matters.
• and 'more transparency for the people') they tried to promote a systemic change from co-operative federalism to implementing more market competi tion in inter -Länder, as well as European inter-regional, relations (Wettbe werbsföderalismus). As expected, those objectives to vigorously reform Euro pean governance and German federalism by strengthening regional inde pendence and individual responsibility met with resistance from the German Social-democrats. But the ideas continue to dominate the debate on refor ming German federalism and re-exporting it in the EU that inspired this liberal political party platform a long while ago when Jacques Delors acted as president of the EU-Commission (Wachendorfer-Schmidt 2003).
